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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic
predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A
random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination
tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money
across winners of the first and second round of the tournament. As
predicted by theory, we find that a more convex prize spread increases
performance in the second round at the expense of first-round perfor-
mance, although the magnitude of these effects is small. Moreover,
the treatment effect is significantly larger for stores that historically
have relatively stable performance as compared to stores with more
noisy performance.
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1 Introduction
Tournament theory is a cornerstone of incentive theory in organizations. Pi-
oneered by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983), and Rosen (1986), tournament theory can explain many
prominent organizational features. Examples include large wage increases
upon promotions (as found by e.g. Murphy 1985, Baker et al. 1994, McCue
1996), a convex wage structure across the levels of the hierarchy (Murphy
1985, Baker et al. 1994, Gibbs 1995), and a positive relation between the
prize spread and the number of people competing for a promotion (Eriksson
1999, Bognanno 2001). Waldman (2008) provides a more extensive discus-
sion of empirical evidence on tournament theory. Crucially, predictions from
tournament theory for organizational architecture follow from employees’ pre-
sumed responses to tournament incentives.
In this paper, we report the results of a natural field experiment we con-
ducted in a privately-held company. We design elimination tournaments
with two rounds that allow us to test several basic hypotheses on employ-
ees’ behavior as derived from standard tournament theory. First, we vary the
distribution of total prize money over the two rounds of the elimination tour-
nament. Theory predicts that a more convex prize structure while keeping
total prize money constant (i.e. simultaneously decreasing the prize for win-
ning the first round and increasing the prize for winning the second round)
leads to better second-round performance at the expense of first-round per-
formance. Second, we investigate whether the level of noise in contestants’
performance affects their performance in the tournament. In theory, noise
dilutes incentives to perform, as it reduces the marginal effect of effort on
the probability of winning.1
To test these hypotheses, we run an elimination tournament among a
randomly chosen subset of the 208 stores of a retail chain in the Netherlands
1Our design allows for a clean test of the effects of prize spread and noise on employees’
incentives to perform well. Tournament theory also generates predictions on the effects of
participant heterogeneity (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Rosen 1986), the incentives to sabotage
(Lazear 1989), the choice of low-risk versus high-risk strategies (Knoeber and Thurman
1994), and self-selection into tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981). See Charness and
Kuhn (2010) and Lazear and Oyer (2009) for recent overviews.
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selling music, movies, and video games. Both rounds of the tournament
last four weeks. Performance in the tournament is measured by the Average
number of Products per Customer (APC), a relatively stable and well-known
performance measure in this company. In the first round, the 144 participat-
ing stores are assigned to poules of four stores that are comparable in terms
of historical performance. After the first round, the two worst-performing
stores of each poule are eliminated, whereas the two best-performing stores
of each poule win a prize and proceed to the second round. In the second
round, stores are once more grouped into poules of four comparable stores.
The two best-performing stores of each poule again win a prize.
To investigate the relation between prize structure and the incentive ef-
fect of the tournament, participating stores are assigned to two different
treatments. The treatments differ by the prize spread only, we keep the to-
tal amount of prize money constant. In the low-spread treatment, prizes are
identical in the two rounds, whereas in the high-spread treatment the second-
round prize is four times as large as the first-round prize. For employees in
the participating stores, the ex ante expected earnings are about 2 percent
of monthly earnings, with prize money ranging from 1.2 percent to 6 percent
of monthly earnings.
Our findings are largely in line with theoretical predictions. First, the
average treatment effect of the tournament is approximately 1.5 percent.
This effect is statistically significant. Second, we find that second-round
performance is 1 percentage point higher in the high-spread treatment as
compared to the low-spread treatment, while first-round performance is 0.8
percentage point lower. These differences are qualitatively in line with theory,
but they are not statistically significant. Third, in the high-spread treatment,
the estimated second-round treatment effect is significantly higher than the
first-round effect, as predicted by theory. Fourth, while theory predicts a
higher first-round performance as compared to second-round performance in
the low-spread treatment, we find the reverse, albeit insignificantly so. As
a result, most of the average treatment effect is concentrated in the second
round of the tournament.
To test for the effect of noise in measured performance on the effect of the
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tournament, we use the variance in performance prior to the experimental
period as our measure of noise. In the assignment of stores to poules, we
take their level of noise into account, so that stores with relatively low (high)
noise in performance are matched to other stores with relatively low (high)
noise. As predicted by theory, noise has a negative effect on the response
to the tournament. This effect is mainly concentrated in the second-period.
The impact is substantial relative to the average treatment effect: while the
stores with least noise experience an estimated treatment effect of about 2.4
percent, the estimated treatment effect is zero for the quartile of stores with
highest noise in performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses related empirical work. The design of the experiment is discussed
in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze a simple elimination tournament model
and derive five testable hypotheses. Section 5 provides summary statistics
and Section 6 describes our estimation strategy. Our findings are presented
and discussed in Section 7.
2 Previous Studies
Two studies use non-experimental field data to test similar hypotheses from
tournament theory. Audas et al. (2004) use the administrative records of
a British financial firm to investigate the effects of prize spread and noise
in promotion decisions on the absence rate of employees. They find that
larger prize spreads, defined as the difference in average earnings between two
adjacent layers in the firm’s hierarchy, reduce absenteeism. More unexplained
variation in promotion decisions increases absenteeism. Based on data from
a cross-section of firms, DeVaro (2006) estimates a structural model treating
prize spread, performance, and promotions as endogenous. He finds a positive
effect of prize spread on workers’ performance ratings, a negative effect of
noise on performance, and a positive effect of noise on the prize spread. We
see our methodology as complementary. By conducting a field experiment
rather than analysing actual career paths, we generate exogenous variation
in prize spread and obtain a simple measure of noise in performance. This
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allows for an easy identification of the effects of prize spread and noise on
performance in tournaments within an organization.2
Field experiments in organizations are scarce. To our knowledge, this is
the first field experiment that studies the effects of an elimination tourna-
ment. Field experiments with one-stage tournaments have been conducted
by Erev et al. (1993) and Bandiera et al. (2009) among fruit pickers and by
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) and Delfgaauw et al. (2009) among
retailers. These studies find a positive effect of tournament incentives on per-
formance, but none of them varies the prize spread. Lim et al. (2009) vary
both the number and the distribution of prizes in contests among fundraisers,
keeping total prize money constant. They find that contests with multiple
identical prizes elicit higher effort as compared to single-prize contests, but
differentiating prizes by rank has no further effect on effort. None of these
studies looks at the effect of noise in the performance measure.
In terms of design, our paper is closely related to a recent laboratory
experiment by Altmann et al. (2008). In a chosen-effort setting, they find
that subjects choose significantly higher effort in the first stage of a two-stage
elimination tournament as compared to a strategically equivalent one-stage
tournament. A more convex prize spread in the elimination tournament,
obtained by decreasing the prize for winning the first round, does not affect
effort in either stage of the tournament, in contrast to theory. Sheremeta
(2010) and Höchtl et al. (2011) compare a one-shot contest with a multi-
stage contest for the case of a single prize, using contest success functions
to determine the winner. Whereas parameters are set such that total effort
should be equivalent in the two treatments, both studies find substantial
overprovision of effort in the elimination tournament relative to the one-shot
contest. Sheremeta (2010) shows that the amount of overprovision relates
to the level of effort subjects chose in a contest without a monetary prize,
2Several studies test elements of tournament theory in a non-organizational setting.
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) show that golf players’ performance increases in the
effect of improvements in relative positions on prize money. Becker and Huselid (1992)
find that race car drivers’ performance increases in prize spread. Knoeber and Thurman
(1994) find a similar result in competitions among broiler producers.
4
suggesting that some people experience non-monetary utility from winning.3
The effects of noise on performance in tournaments are rarely studied in
experiments. An exception is Bull et al. (1987), who find in a laboratory ex-
periment with chosen-effort that a simultaneous change in noise and marginal
cost of effort that leaves equilibrium effort unaffected indeed leads to similar
levels of effort chosen by subjects. Given the prevalence of relative perfor-
mance incentives and noisy performance measures in real-world settings, our
study provides an important test of this part of tournament theory.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment took place in the period September - November 2010 in
a retail chain in the Netherlands that sells computer games, music, and
movies. In September 2010, the retail chain owned 208 geographically dis-
persed stores, operating under two different brands. Each store employs on
average 5 employees, including a store manager. All strategically impor-
tant decisions are made by the company’s top management. The company’s
management decides on the range of products sold, pricing, as well as adver-
tisement. New products arrive in stores complete with instructions on how
to sell them. Store managers have limited discretion: they are responsible
for day-to-day operations. They can primarily boost sales by effective use of
the sales force, and by encouraging customers to buy product complements
or otherwise related products. Employees receive rather weak incentive pay
on top of their base salary. Payments are based on yearly growth in the
average number of products and revenues per transaction, the average num-
ber of transactions per hour, and a subjective performance evaluation. In
addition, store managers have the opportunity to earn a yearly bonus based
on reductions in wage costs as a percentage of revenues and on reductions in
waste. These incentive schemes remained in place during the experiment.
We set up an elimination tournament for a randomly selected set of stores.
3Several lab experiments analyse the effects of prize spread in a standard tournament
setting, see e.g. Bull et al. (1987), Harbring and Ihrlenbusch (2003), and Freeman and
Gelber (2010). Charness and Kuhn (2010) provide an overview.
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The performance measure in the tournament is the Average number of Prod-
ucts sold per Customer (APC). This performance measure can be directly
computed from the company’s operational database, which records the num-
ber of products sold per store per week, and the number of customers (i.e.
transactions) per store per week. Everyone in the company is familiar with
APC as performance measure. It is part of employees’ standard incentive
scheme, and stores receive a weekly report on their performance including
APC. The reason that APC was chosen as a performance measure and not,
for instance, sales is twofold. First, it makes unequivocally clear how stores
can enhance performance: through an increase in cross-selling. Second, there
is relatively little variation in this measure over time. Figure 1 shows the av-
erage APC per week for the period of week 30 in 2009 until week 45 in 2010.
The elimination tournament consisted of 2 rounds, both lasting four weeks
with a two-week break in between. The first round ran from week 36 to week
39 in 2010, the second round from week 42 to week 45. In the first round,
the participating stores were assigned to poules of four stores. All employees
of the two best-performing stores per poule, i.e. those with highest APC
cumulative over the four weeks in round 1, received a bonus. Moreover,
these stores qualified for the second round of the tournament, while all other
stores (the bottom-two stores of each poule) were eliminated. In the second
round, qualified stores were again assigned to poules of four. As before, all
employees of the top-two performing stores per poule over the second round
received a bonus. After round 2, the tournament ended.
We scheduled a two-week gap between the end of the first round and
the start of the second round. This period was used to communicate the
results of the first round to all treatment stores and to inform the winners
of the first round of their second-round assignment. This two-week period is
not included in the estimations below, as otherwise a response to winning or
losing would affect the estimates of the store-fixed effects.
In February 2010, we ran another experiment at the same retail chain,
aimed at studying incentive effects of relative performance pay (the results
are reported in Delfgaauw et al., 2010). At that time, a randomly selected
set of stores could earn an additional bonus, while the remaining stores were
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promised a similar opportunity later in the year. Hence, all stores that did
not participate in the first experiment (115 stores) do participate in the
current elimination tournament. Furthermore, to check whether assignment
to treatment or control in the first experiment affects performance in the
elimination tournament, we randomly select an additional 29 stores from
the stores that comprised the treatment group in the first experiment to
participate also in the current tournament. Below, we check whether these
29 stores respond differently to the current treatment as compared to the
stores that were part of the control group in the February 2010 experiment.
If we find no differences, we can be assured that there are no spill-over effects
of the February 2010 experiment. In that experiment, a total of 15 stores
were (non-randomly) not allowed to participate in the first experiment, for a
variety of reasons. One of these stores was closed during 2010. Furthermore,
6 new stores were opened during the year. These 20 stores all participate
in the current tournament, but since they were non-randomly assigned, they
are left out of the analysis. Furthermore, two stores were not allowed to
participate in the current experiment and, hence, are also left out of the
analysis. This leaves us with 186 stores in the analysis. Of these stores, 62
comprise the control group, while the remaining 124 comprise the treatment
group.
To study the effect of prize spread on the incentive effect of the tourna-
ment, we assign the participating stores to two different treatment groups.
The only difference between the two treatments is the prize spread. Thus, we
keep total prize money identical across the treatments. In the first round of
the low-spread treatment, the bonus for being one of the two best-performing
stores in the poule is 35 euro gross for a full-time employee. In the second
round, the bonus is again 35 euro gross. Hence, per eight stores, employees
of two stores win in total 70 euro, employees of two other stores win 35 euro,
while the employees of four stores win nothing. In the high-spread treatment,
the first-round bonus is 17.50 euro gross. The bonus in the second round is
70 euro. Hence, per eight stores, employees of two stores in the high-spread
treatment earn 87.50, employees of two other stores earn 17.50, and four
stores receive nothing. Comparing the two treatments, the expected mone-
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tary bonus per employee at the start of the tournament is identical in both
treatments (26.25 euro), while the prize spread is higher in the high-spread
treatment than in the low-spread treatment.4 All bonuses earned were paid
after the tournament ended (in December).
We also examine the effect of noise in performance on the incentive effect
of the tournament. We take stores’ standard deviation in the performance
measure APC over the period August 2009 to August 2010 as our measure
of noise. Note that this period does not include the experimental period, so
that our measure of noise is not affected by the response to the tournament
incentives. Furthermore, store’s assignment to poules was partially based on
this performance measure, as described below, so that high-noise (low-noise)
stores competed against other high-noise (low-noise) stores.
The assignment of stores in the treatment group to the different treat-
ment conditions (low prize spread and high prize spread) went as follows.
First, we stratified the stores by their noise in the performance measure. We
divided them in two equally large groups, one group with the stores with
the highest standard deviation in APC and one group with stores with the
lowest standard deviation. Subsequently, we randomly assigned half of the
stores in each noise-group to the low-spread treatment and the other half to
the high-spread treatment. By doing so, we created four groups of equal size
(31 stores) that differ in two dimensions: high noise stores versus low noise
stores, and low-spread treatment versus high-spread treatment. A similar
procedure was used to assign the 20 non-randomly selected stores to these
four groups, so that each group contains 36 stores. In the first round of the
tournament, stores compete against three other stores from the same group.
The assignment to poules is based on historical performance. Per group,
we rank stores on average performance (APC) in the period August 2009 to
August 2010. The best-scoring four stores are placed together in a poule, as
well as numbers 5 to 8, etc. This creates in total 36 poules, with 9 poules for
each treatment-noise group.
In the second round, we again assigned stores to poules on the basis
4For employees, a bonus of 35 euro is about 2.5 percent of monthly gross earnings.
Parttimers receive an amount proportional to their contract size.
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of average performance (APC) in the period August 2009 to August 2010.
Assignment was not based on performance in the first round, so as to avoid
ratchet effects. In both treatments, we kept the stores in the high-noise group
and the low-noise group separate, with one exception: in both treatments, the
two stores with the lowest APC in each of the two noise-groups were placed
together in a poule.5 Hence, in the second stage of the tournament, we have
in total 72 stores divided over 18 poules, with 4 poules per treatment-noise
group plus 1 poule per treatment with stores from both the low-noise group
and the high-noise group. Out of the 20 non-randomly assigned stores partic-
ipating in the tournament, 9 made it to the second round. Hence, we can use
63 participating stores in the analysis of the second-round treatment effects,
which are almost equally divided over the four treatment-noise groups.
All communication about the elimination tournament to the stores went
through the company’s internal communication channel. Stores were not
aware of our involvement, so that our experiment qualifies as a natural field
experiment (Harrison and List 2006). A week before the first round started,
all stores of the retail chain learned that a new incentive event would take
place. We explained that all stores who did not participate in the February
2010 experiment would participate in the current experiment, as well as a
randomly selected number of stores that did participate in February.6 A
few days later, all participating stores received a message with the rules
of the elimination tournament. Stores in the high-spread and low-spread
treatment received identical messages, except for the amounts of prize money
mentioned for winning the first and second round. We informed them that
other stores, randomly selected, faced a different division of prize money, to
reduce confusion and suspicion that might arise when employees learn during
the tournament that other stores were entitled to different prizes. Also, we
explained that assignment to poules in the second round would be based on
5As it turns out, seven of these 8 stores were among the 20 stores that were non-
randomly assigned to a treatment and are therefore left out of the analysis. The remaining
store belongs to the high-spread, high-noise group. We treat this store the same as all
other stores in this group. Leaving the store out of the analysis does not affect the results.
6As few stores actually won a bonus in the February-experiment, this was not perceived
as unfair.
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the average APC over the period of August 2009 up to August 2010, not
on performance during the first round. Just before the start of each round,
the stores (still) participating in the tournament received the assignment to
poules for all stores, with for each store the average APC over the period
of August 2009 up to August 2010. Hence, the stores could verify that
they were matched to stores with similar historical performance. During the
tournament, each store received weekly feedback on the ranking of stores in
its poule in the form of a poster with APC-figures for all stores in the poule.
These posters could be attached to a larger poster, which store managers
were instructed to hang in a prominent place (typically the store’s canteen).
4 Deriving Hypotheses
In this section, we set up a simple model to derive the hypotheses that our
experiment allows us to test. For a general treatment of the effects of prize
spread and noise in tournaments, see Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Gibbs
(1996). A general model of incentive effects of elimination tournaments can
be found in Rosen (1986).7
Consider four identical agents that participate in a two-stage elimination
tournament. In the first stage, the agents compete pairwise. The winners
of the first stage receive prize 1 ≥ 0 and go on to the second stage of the
tournament. The first-stage losers are eliminated from the tournament and
receive nothing. In the second stage, the two first-stage winners compete
against each other for one prize with value 2  0.8
Let  be agent ’s performance in stage . Performance depends on
effort  and on idiosyncratic noise  :
 = () + ,
7Recent theoretical advances on elimination tournaments include endogenizing the
number of stages and the prize structure (Fu and Lu 2009) and optimal seeding when
participants are heterogeneous (Groh et al. 2010).
8In the experiment, we have competition between teams rather than between indi-
viduals. Also, rather than competition in poules of 2, we have 4 contestants per poule
competing for two prizes per poule. This does not qualitatively affect the predictions from
the theoretical analysis.
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where (·) is concave. Effort and noise are not observable, performance is
verifiable. Agent ’s utility in stage  depends on income  and effort cost:
 =  − (),
where (·) is strictly convex: 0  0, 00  0. We neglect discounting across
stages of the tournament and assume an interior solution for optimal effort.
We aim to derive a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
In the contest between agents  and  in stage , let ∆ =  − 
be the noise difference. We assume that ∆ is distributed according to
density function (·) which is unimodal and symmetric around zero and twice
continuously differentiable, with cumulative density function  (·). Across
contests, draws of ∆ are independent. Given effort ˆ of contender  in a
given stage, agent ’s probability of winning that stage is given by [()−
(ˆ)  −∆] = 1 −  [(ˆ) − ()]. Hence, the marginal effect of effort
on the winning probability is given by  [(ˆ)− ()]0().
First, consider the second stage. In a symmetric equilibrium, both agents
optimally exert the same level of effort, as implicitly given by first-order
condition
(0)0(∗=2)2 − 0(∗=2) = 0. (1)
In the symmetric equilibrium, the probability of winning the second stage
is equal to  (0) = 1
2
, so that second-stage expected utility (conditional on
winning the first stage) equals =2 = 122−(∗=2). As a result, the expected
value of winning the contest in the first stage is given by 1+ 122− (∗=2).
In a symmetric equilibrium, maximising first-stage utility yields the following







− 0(∗=1) = 0. (2)
By applying the implicit function theorem to first-order conditions (2)
and (1), we derive the following predictions regarding the effects of noise in
the performance measure and of the prize structure on performance in the
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elimination tournament. Proposition 1 describes the effect of noise.9
Proposition 1 A larger variance of the noise distribution (·), so that mass
is shifted from the mode to the tails, leads to lower performance in both stages
of the tournament.




(0)00(∗=2)− 00(∗=2)  0.
The effect on first-round effort is similar.
Next, we derive the effects of increasing the convexity of the prize spread.
Consider two tournaments with identical total prize money, but different
prize spreads. Using superscript  () to refer to the tournament with
low (high) prize spread, we have 1  1 , 2  2 , and 21 + 2 =
21 +2 . This yields the following predictions regarding the effect of prize
spread on performance in the second and first round, respectively.
Proposition 2 Second-stage performance in the high-spread tournament is
better than second-stage performance in the low-spread tournament.




(0)00(∗=2)− 00(∗=2)  0.
2  2 implies that =2  =2.
Proposition 3 First-stage performance in the low-spread tournament is bet-
ter than first-stage performance in the high-spread tournament.
Proof. By Proposition 2 and 2  2 , second-stage effort is higher in
the high-spread treatment, so that (=2)  (=2). As total prize money is
9In estimating the effects of noise, we use the variance in individual stores’ performance
 rather than the variance of the difference in the error terms ∆ as in Proposition 1.
This has qualitatively no effect on the hypothesis of the effect of noise. The distribution
of the difference between two i.i.d. random variables with density (·) is unimodal with
a maximum at zero when (·) is unimodal (Vogt 1983). By Bienaymé’s formula, the
variance of the difference of two i.i.d. random variables is the sum of the variance of the
two variables. Hence, the variance of ∆ is increasing in the variance of 
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identical, we have 1 + 122 = 1 + 122 , so that 1 + 122 − (=2) 
1 + 122 − (=2). By (2), this implies that =1  =1.
Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that a higher prize spread increases
second-round performance at the expense of first-round performance. A
higher second-stage bonus induces agents to exert more effort in the second
round, which reduces the expected value of winning the first round.
Lastly, given a certain prize structure, the model provides predictions on
first-round performance in the tournament relative to second-round perfor-
mance.
Proposition 4 If 1 ≥ 2, performance in the first stage is better than
performance in the second stage.
Proof. Second-stage utility 1
2
2 − (∗=2)  0. Hence, if 1 ≥ 2, 1 +
1
2
2 − (∗=2)  2. Comparing (1) and (2), it follows that ∗=1  ∗=2.
Proposition 5 If 1 ≤ 122, performance in the first stage is worse than
performance in the second stage.
Proof. Second-stage effort cost (∗=2)  0. Hence, if 1 ≤ 122, 1+ 122−
(∗=2)  2. Comparing (1) and (2), it follows that ∗=1  ∗=2.
In the experiment, we have two treatments with identical total prize
money but different prize structures. The first treatment has a relatively
low prize spread, with equal prizes in both rounds: 1 = 2 . The sec-
ond treatment has a relatively high prize spread, with 1 = 142 . Hence,
Propositions 2 and 3 predict that stores in the low-spread treatment show
better first-round performance than stores in the high-spread treatment, but
lower second-round performance. Furthermore, Proposition 4 predicts that
in the low-spread treatment the first-round treatment effect should be higher
than the second-round treatment effect, while Proposition 5 predicts the re-
verse for the high-spread treatment. Lastly, in both treatments we divide the
stores in two groups depending on the historical variance of the performance
measure. Proposition 1 predicts that we should observe lower treatment ef-




In our estimations, performance is given by the Average number of Products
per Customer per week (APC). Table 1 shows that on average, a customer
buys 1.82 products per transaction. During the experimental period, the
average APC-score is somewhat lower than in the year preceding the tourna-
ment. Comparing the stores in the control group with the stores in the high
and low prize spread group, we find no differences in historical performance.
APC is a relatively stable performance measure. Averaged across stores, the
within-store standard deviation over the period August 2009 to August 2010
is 0.15. There is some variation in this measure of noise across stores, as
it ranges from a minimum of 0.07 to a maximum of 0.54, with a median
of 0.13. Figure 2 shows that the distribution of noise is very similar across
the control group and the high-spread and low-spread treatment groups.10
In other observable store characteristics, we find no statistically significant
differences except for the share of female employees: stores in the control
group have relatively few female employees.
Grouping the treatment stores by noise group, we find that treatment
stores with a large standard deviation in APC show a higher average APC,
which is an indication of heteroscedasticity. The difference in noisiness of
the performance measure between the low-noise and the high-noise group
is substantial. The standard deviation of APC in the high-noise group is
about 50% larger than in the low-noise group. Proposition 1 states that
the treatment effect should be decreasing in the variance of the performance
measure, provided that the density at the mode of the error distribution
is smaller for high-noise stores than for low-noise stores. Figure 3 suggests
that this holds in the data, by showing kernel densities of the residuals of
a regression of APC on store-fixed effects using all observations before the
tournament starts. The peak of the kernel density is clearly lower for stores in
the high-noise group than for stores in the low-noise group. In both groups,
the peak lies marginally below zero. Other store characteristics show no
10Figure 2 shows that there are a few stores with unusually large standard deviations
in APC. None of the results in this paper are affected by removing these stores from the
analysis.
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differences between the high and low-noise stores.
6 Estimation
We assess the effects of the tournament incentives using OLS with week fixed
effects and store fixed effects. Let  be the performance of store  in week.
Let  () be a dummy variable that takes values 1 for treatment (control)
stores. Furthermore, based on the results of the first round of the tournament
we create a dummy that takes value 1 for stores that have won in the first
round (and, hence, take part in the second round of the tournament) and
a dummy  that takes value 1 for the stores that are eliminated from the
tournament after the first round. Lastly, 1 and 2 are two dummy variables
indicating the weeks in which the first and second round of the tournament
took place, respectively. We estimate the average treatment effect by
 =  +  +  [1 +2] + 2 +  (3)
where  and  are store and week fixed effects, respectively, and  is
an error term.11 Coefficient  gives the average treatment effect of stores in
competition versus the stores in the control group. The stores that lost in
the first round are non-randomly selected and may respond to losing. Hence,
these stores cannot be used as control stores in the second round, and there-
fore we separate out their second-round performance from the estimation of
the treatment effect. It is straightforward to adjust (3) to separate the first
and second round average treatment effect.
To estimate how the level of noise in a store’s performance measure affects
the response to the tournament incentives, we use the standard deviation in
the performance measure APC over the period August 2009 to August 2010
as a measure of noise. By interacting the treatment dummy with the standard
deviation , we can assess whether the treatment effect is heterogeneous in
11In our estimations we cluster standard errors at the store level to correct for serial
correlation within stores and heteroscedasticity across stores, as suggested by Bertrand et
al. (2004).
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noise, as predicted by Proposition 1. This implies estimating
 = ++ [1 +2]+ [1 +2] + [1 + ( + )2] +2+
(4)
where  measures how sensitive the treatment effect is to noise, and the term
 [1 + ( + )2]  measures how performance during the experimental
period relates to the standard deviation in APC. The latter term is necessary
to control for any time-specific effects of noise, which might otherwise be
picked up by . Note that we continue to leave out the first-round losers
from the estimation of the second-round effects.
To estimate the effect of prize spread, we split dummy  into two treat-
ment group dummies. Variable  () takes value 1 when store  is assigned
to the low-spread (high-spread) treatment. Replacing  in (3) by the two
treatment group dummies gives
 =  +  + [ +  ] [1 +2] + 2 +  (5)
Again, this expression is easily adjusted to estimate the treatment effects in
the two tournament rounds separately.
7 Results
7.1 Average treatment effect
The first column of Table 2 gives the results of estimating (3). We find a
statistically significant effect of the tournament on performance. The average
treatment effect is 0.028 extra products per customer. This corresponds to
an increase of 1.5% of the mean score on Average number of Products sold
per Client (APC) and to 20% of within-store standard deviation of APC. The
second column of Table 2 separates the estimated average treatment effect
by tournament round. On average, the first-round effect is positive but sta-
tistically insignificant. In the second round, the treatment effect is about 2.5
percent extra products per customer. The difference between the estimates
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for the first and second-round treatment effect is statistically significant with
a p-value of 0.056. Both estimations show that the stores that lost in the first
round perform about as well as the stores in the control group during the
second-round period. Hence, two weeks after their elimination, these stores
seem to have returned to business-as-usual performance.
We want to exclude that the higher second-round treatment effect is
caused by differences in time trends across stores. If some stores experience
an upward trend while others experience a downward trend, then relatively
many stores on a positive time trend will be selected into the second round.
To analyze this, we run a pseudo-tournament among the stores in the con-
trol group. First, we group the control stores into poules in a similar way
as the assignment of the treatment stores. We create 13 poules of 4 stores
and two poules of 5 stores with similar average performance over the pe-
riod August 2009 to August 2010. We identify for each of the poules the
two stores with the highest performance during the first round of the experi-
ment. Next, we compare the performance of the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of this
pseudo-competition during the second round of the experiment with the per-
formance of the real winners and losers from the treatment group. Figure 4
shows for each of these four groups the kernel densities of performance during
the second round of the experiment. The performance distributions of the
winners and losers of the pseudo-competition are very similar. Hence, in the
control group, the stores that perform relatively well during the first round of
the tournament do not show better or worse performance during the second
round. Furthermore, the performance distribution of the first-round losers of
the real tournament is similar to the performance distributions of the control
stores. This again suggests that treatment stores not making it to the second
round return to regular performance within two weeks of their elimination.
In contrast, the second-round performance distribution of first-round treat-
ment group winners is shifted to the right and has more mass between 2 and
2.4 as compared to the other groups. Hence, the second-round treatment
effect is not caused by a selection of stores that experience a positive trend
in performance.12
12Another possible source of selection bias is a difference between stores in responsiveness
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Next, we analyze whether there are carry-over effects from the earlier
experiment we did in this company. As described in Section 3, all stores
comprising the control group in the earlier experiment participated in the
current tournament, as well as 29 randomly selected stores from the treat-
ment group of the earlier experiment. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show
that the response of stores that did participate in the earlier experiment is
not significantly different from the response of the other stores, neither in
the first round nor in the second round. Hence, our current results are not
affected by the earlier experiment.
7.2 Noise
The first hypothesis of the model that we test is Proposition 1. Column
1 in Table 4 reports the results of estimating (4). We find that noisiness
of performance measure APC has a negative effect on the response to the
tournament. This negative effect is close to being significantly different from
zero at conventional levels (p-value = 0.11).13 An increase in the level of
noise by one standard deviation reduces the treatment effect by 1 percentage
point. As we have taken up the variable noise in deviation from its mean, the
first coefficient in column 1 gives the estimated treatment effect at the mean
level of noise. This effect is about 1.3 percent and statistically different from
zero. Wald tests show that the estimated treatment effect is significantly
different from zero for stores with a standard deviation in APC up to 0.15
(i.e. for 70 percent of the stores).
In column 2 of Table 4, the estimation of (4) is separated by tournament
round. We find a small and statistically insignificant effect of noise in the
first round. In the second round, however, noise has a strongly significant,
negative effect on performance in the tournament. Wald tests show that the
second-round treatment effect is statistically different from zero for stores
to competitive incentives. In Section 7.3 we will show that there is no evidence for such a
difference.
13Our measure of noise is the within-store standard deviation of APC. This includes
both idiosyncratic and common shocks (i.e. time-fixed effects in APC). If we exclude the
common shocks from our measure of noise, the estimated effect of noise on the treatment
effect has the same magnitude, but is more precisely estimated (p-value = 0.08).
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with a standard deviation below 0.16.14 Hence, we find support for Proposi-
tion 1, in particular in the second round of the tournament. Note also that
higher noise leads to weaker performance during the experimental period,
underlining the importance of controlling for this time-specific effect.
Recall that noise in the performance measure APC is a pre-existing store
characteristic, not randomly assigned. Hence, it is possible that noise is par-
tially caused by or correlated with other store-specific characteristics. When
these other store-specific characteristics affect stores’ response to the tour-
nament incentives, the effect of noise found in Table 4 might be spurious or
estimated with bias. Insofar as these store characteristics are unobservable
(at least for us), we cannot rule out this possibility. However, for observable
store characteristics, this can be assessed. First, we run an OLS regression of
our measure of noise on all available store characteristics (regression output
can be found in the Appendix, Table A1). The observable store character-
istics explain about 25 percent of the variation in noise across stores. Most
explanatory power comes from the average level of performance APC and
regional variation. Next, we take the residuals from this cross-section regres-
sion of noise, and use these residuals instead of the standard deviation of
APC in estimating (4). Hence, we use the variation in noise that is not cor-
related with observable store characteristics. The results of this estimation
are presented in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5. We find that the estimates of
the effect of residual noise on the response to competition are very similar to
the estimates when using our standard measure of noise. This rules out that
the negative effect of noise on the response to competition is caused by one
or more of the observable store characteristics.
7.3 Prize spread
To analyse the effects of prize spread, we estimate the effects of the two
treatments separately. The first column of Table 6 shows the estimated
average treatment effects over both rounds for the low-spread and high-spread
treatments separately, as given by (5). Both treatments have a similar effect
14A quadratic specification of the effect of  does not improve the estimation.
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on performance, of around 1.5 percent in magnitude. Both estimates are
significantly different from zero with a p-value of about 0.05.
Column 2 of Table 6 differentiates these estimates by tournament rounds.
This estimation allows us to test the hypotheses that follow from Proposi-
tion 2 to 5. First, we focus on comparing the low-spread and the high-
spread treatment. Propositions 2 and 3 predict better second-round perfor-
mance in the high-spread treatment and better first-round performance in
the low-spread treatment, respectively. We find that first-round performance
in the low-spread treatment is indeed 0.8 percentage point better than in the
high-spread treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant. In
the second round, the treatment effect is 1 percentage point higher in the
high-spread treatment, but again the difference is not statistically significant.
Hence, both effects have the sign as predicted by theory, but the effects are
small.
Next, we compare first and second-round performance within a treat-
ment. Proposition 4 predicts that in the low-spread treatment, the first-
round treatment effect is above the second-round treatment effect. The es-
timation results in column 2 of Table 6 shows that we actually find higher
second-round performance, although the 1 percentage point difference is not
statistically significant. Proposition 5 predicts that in the high-spread treat-
ment, first-round performance should be below second-round performance.
This is clearly borne out in column 2 of Table 6, where the difference be-
tween first and second-round performance is estimated at 2.7 percent, which
is significant at a p-value of 0.022.
Two extensions of the basic model presented in Section 4 might explain
why the second-round treatment effect is higher than the first-round treat-
ment effect in the low-spread treatment, in contrast to the model’s predic-
tion. First, there may be a selection effect. If stores differ in responsiveness
to competition, then relatively responsive stores are selected into the second
round. If so, we should compare the first and second-round treatment effect
of the stores that won the first round. However, the stochastic nature of
performance implies that we cannot simply compare the first and second-
round performance of the first-round winners. Given that a store won the
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first round, its expected value of the stochastic component in APC during
the first round is positive, yielding an upward bias in the estimate of the
first-round effect. Here, we can use the pseudo-competition we conducted
in the control group, as described in Section 7.1, to assess the magnitude of
this bias, as follows. The pseudo-competition gives us winners and losers of
a competition purely determined by the stochastic component, in the same
period as the first round of the tournament. We can compare the difference
in performance between the winners and losers of the pseudo-competition to
the difference in performance between winners and losers of the first round
of the actual tournament. If stores are homogeneous, the theory as described
in Section 4 predicts that, while on average winners (losers) in the real tour-
nament perform better than the winners (losers) in the pseudo-competition,
the difference between winners and losers is similar across the treatment and
control groups. If, on the other hand, stores differ in responsiveness to com-
petition, the difference between winners and losers should be larger in the
real tournament than in the pseudo-tournament.
Column 3 in Table 6 examines whether stores are heterogeneous in re-
sponsiveness to competition. The first five coefficients give the estimated
performance during the first round of the experiment for five groups of stores,
all relative to the performance of the stores in the control group that ‘lost’ the
pseudo-competition. First, the ‘winners’ of the pseudo-competition perform
about 4 percentage points better than the ‘losers’. Comparing the difference
in performance between the first-round winners and losers in the treatment
groups, we see that in the low-spread treatment this difference is marginally
higher at 4.3 percentage points, while in the high-spread treatment it is even
smaller at 3.3 percentage points. These differences are nowhere close to be-
ing statistically significant. Hence, we find no evidence for differences in
responsiveness across stores.
An alternative explanation is that winning a competition may provide
employees with non-monetary benefits such as status, social recognition, or
simply the joy of winning (Auriol and Renault 2008, Besley and Ghatak
2008, Frey and Neckermann 2008, Moldovanu et al. 2007). Several recent
studies suggest that these non-monetary benefits are substantial, by show-
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ing that people respond to competition even when there is no money at
stake (i.e. when only relative performance information is provided), see Az-
mat and Iriberri (2010), Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2009), Delfgaauw et al.
(2009), Kosfeld and Neckermann (2010), and Sheremeta (2010). Accepting
the presence of non-monetary utility of winning a competition, the result that
the first-round treatment effect is above the second-round treatment effect
in the low-spread treatment would suggest that winning the second round
yields higher non-monetary utility than winning the first round. Note that
the addition of a non-monetary benefit of winning the second round of the
tournament to the basic model in Section 4 does not change the predictions
of the effects of changes in the prize spread. In particular, the difference
between first-round and second-round performance in the high-spread tour-
nament should be larger than this difference in the low-spread tournament.
Computed from the estimates in the second column of Table 6, the magni-
tude of this difference-in-differences is about 1.8 percentage points, but it is
not statistically significant.
8 Concluding Remarks
Examining whether workers respond as predicted to tournament incentives
in their natural working environment is important for linking tournament
theory to organizational policies regarding wages and promotions. We have
designed a natural field experiment in a private company to test several
predictions on the effects of prize structure and noise in an elimination tour-
nament. As predicted, we find that increased convexity of the prize spread in-
creases second-round performance at the expense of first-round performance.
Furthermore, workers with relatively volatile performance hardly respond to
tournament incentives, while workers whose performance measure is stable
increase performance significantly. One finding is at odds with standard the-
ory: In a treatment with equal prizes for winning the first and second round,
performance is better in the second round than in the first round. This
suggests that workers attach non-monetary benefits to becoming the overall
winner of the tournament.
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The magnitude of the effects we find is in line with the strength of the
incentive. On average, employees earned a bonus equal to 2 percent of their
monthly earnings. The average treatment effect on the performance measure
APC (Average number of Products Sold per Client) was about 1.5 percent. In
the end, the company’s management cares about sales revenues rather than
APC. However, we find no effect of the experiment on sales. Apparently,
workers have means to increase APC without increasing revenue, suggesting
that APC is prone to gaming.
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Figure 1: Mean of Average number of Products per Customer (APC) across
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Figure 2: Kernel densities of within store standard deviation of APC in the
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
mean Std mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Performance (store averages)
APC (Average number of Products per Customer), all weeks++ 1.82 0.10 1.81 0.09 1.82 0.12 1.83 0.08 1.81 0.08 1.85 0.12
APC assignment period (weeks 32/2009 - 30/2010)++ 1.83 0.10 1.82 0.09 1.83 0.12 1.83 0.08 1.81 0.08 1.85 0.12
APC Round 1 (weeks 36/2010 - 39/2010) 1.78 0.10 1.77 0.09 1.80 0.12 1.79 0.08 1.79 0.10 1.80 0.10
APC Round 2 (weeks 42/2010 - 45/2010) 1.75 0.13 1.73 0.11 1.76 0.15 1.76 0.12 1.76 0.13 1.75 0.14
APC Round 2, first-round winners 1.79 0.18 1.80 0.11 1.79 0.15 1.80 0.15
APC Round 2, first-round losers 1.72 0.11 1.72 0.11 1.73 0.11 1.71 0.11
Noise
Within-store standard deviation of APC (noise)+++ 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.18 0.06
in the assignment period (weeks 32/2009 - 30/2010)
Store characteristics
Number of employees 5.03 2.17 4.93 1.82 5.00 2.11 5.15 2.55 5.11 2.55 5.03 2.11
Percentage female employees** 0.36 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.39 0.25 0.39 0.25
Mean tenure of employees (months) 38.09 27.96 35.11 31.06 38.55 29.90 40.56 22.37 38.68 28.83 40.42 23.74
Mean age of employees 24.49 3.68 24.41 3.91 24.32 3.76 24.74 3.40 24.86 4.05 24.20 3.02
Number of stores 186 62 62 62 62 62
For one store in the control group, store characteristics were not available.
***, **, * denote statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, between control, low-spread and high-spread stores (F-test).
+++, ++, + denote statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, between control, low-noise and high-noise stores (F-test).
All stores
Treatment group Noise group
Low noise High noiseControl group High-spreadLow-spread
Table 2: Average treatment effect 
Dependent variable: APC
(1) (2)
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) 0.028
(0.011)**
Treatment * Round 1 0.014
(0.011)
Winners * Round 2 0.047
(0.018)***
Losers * Round 2 -0.014 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015)
Store-fixed effects yes yes
Week-fixed effects yes yes
Store-week observations 12079 12079
Stores 186 186
R2 0.4471 0.4473
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Winners and Losers refer to the outcome of the first round of the tournament for the treatment stores.
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3: Carry-over effects
Dependent variable: APC
(1) (2)
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) 0.029
(0.013)**
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) * -0.006
Participant earlier experiment (0.016)
Treatment * Round 1 0.017
(0.011)
Treatment * Round 1 * Participant earlier experiment -0.016
(0.014)
Winners * Round 2 0.043
(0.021)**
Winners * Round 2 * Participant earlier experiment 0.020
(0.028)
Losers * Round 2 -0.014 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015)
Store-fixed effects yes yes
Week-fixed effects yes yes
Store-week observations 12079 12079
Stores 186 186
R2 0.4471 0.4474
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Winners and Losers refer to the outcome of the first round of the tournament for the treatment stores.
Participant earlier experiment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for treatment stores assigned to 
the treatment group in an earlier experiment ran in February 2010.
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4: Noise in performance and the treatment effect 
Dependent variable: APC
(1) (2)
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) 0.024
(0.010)**
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) * StDev -0.321
(0.198)
(Round 1 + (Winners + Control) * Round 2) * StDev -0.318
(0.104)***
Treatment * Round 1 0.011
(0.010)
Treatment * Round 1 * StDev -0.188
(0.199)
Round 1 * StDev -0.365
(0.111)***
Winners * Round 2 0.041
(0.017)**
Winners * Round 2 * StDev -0.632
(0.282)**
(Winners + Control) * Round 2 * StDev -0.269
(0.140)*
Losers * Round 2 -0.015 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014)
Store-fixed effects yes yes
Week-fixed effects yes yes
Store-week observations 12079 12079
Stores 186 186
R2 0.4494 0.4497
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Winners and Losers refer to the outcome of the first round of the tournament for the treatment stores.
StDev is a store's standard deviation of APC over the period August 2009 to August 2010. 
This variable is mean-centered. 
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5: Noise uncorrelated with observables
Dependent variable: APC
(1) (2)
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) 0.022
(0.011)**
Treatment * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) * Residual noise -0.342
(0.212)
(Round 1 + (Winners + Control) * Round 2) * Residual noise -0.225
(0.168)
Treatment * Round 1 0.009
(0.010)
Treatment * Round 1 * Residual noise -0.203
(0.184)
Round 1 * Residual noise -0.230
(0.150)
Winners * Round 2 0.036
(0.017)**
Winners * Round 2 * Residual noise -0.800
(0.409)*
(Winners + Control) * Round 2 * Residual noise -0.219
(0.211)
Losers * Round 2 -0.015 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014)
Store-fixed effects yes yes
Week-fixed effects yes yes
Store-week observations 12017 12017
Stores 185 185
R2 0.4485 0.4489
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Winners and Losers refer to the outcome of the first round of the tournament for the treatment stores.
Residual noise refers to the residuals of the OLS regression of stores' standard deviation of APC
on all observable store-characteristics, as presented in Table A1. This variable is mean-centered. 
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 6: Estimated treatment effects: prize spread
Dependent variable: APC
(1) (2) (3)
Low spread * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) 0.030
(0.016)*
High spread * (Round 1 + Winners * Round 2) 0.026
(0.013)**
Low spread * Round 1 0.021
(0.015)
High spread * Round 1 0.006
(0.010)
Control * Pseudo-winners * Round 1 0.072
(0.012)***
Low spread * Losers * Round 1 0.015
(0.012)
Low spread * Winners * Round 1 0.094
(0.022)***
High spread * Losers  Round 1 0.011
(0.013)
High spread * Winners  Round 1 0.071
(0.012)***
Low spread * Winners * Round 2 0.038 0.041
(0.025) (0.025)
High spread * Winners * Round 2 0.057 0.058
(0.023)** (0.023)**
Losers * Round 2 -0.014 -0.005 -0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Store-fixed effects yes yes yes
Week-fixed effects yes yes yes
Store-week observations 12079 12079 12079
Stores 186 186 186
R2 0.4471 0.4474 0.4495
Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Winners and Losers refer to the outcome of the first round of the tournament for the treatment stores.
Control * Pseudo-winners refers to the stores in the control group that 'won' the pseudo-competition.
Reference category for first-round effects in Column 3 are the 'losers' of the pseudo-competition.
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.




Number of employees 0.001
(0.003)
Number of employees in full-time equivalents 0.000
(0.000)
Average age employees -0.001
(0.002)
Percentage of female employees 0.010
(0.017)









Standard errors in parentheses.
Mean standard deviation of APC are based on the period August 2009 to August 2010.
The personnel variables are extracted from the companies' database as of September 1, 2010. 
The personnel information is missing for 1 store in the analysis.
Brand 2 is a dummy variable for stores operating under the companies' smaller brand name.
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: standard deviation of APC
